DISCLAIMER

Portions of this
The reactor shall not be operated unless the following conditions are met:
a.1.
Compliance with this specification depends on the core loading, and will be documented in the Reload Design Report (RDR). The outlet temperature for the UO-1 test is approximately the same as would be expected from a reference driver fuel assembly. Since a significant temperature difference is required for an assembly to exceed this specification limit, compliance is expected. 
EXPERIENCE WITH SIMILAR DESIGNS
The U02 pins and the S-4 pins are the highest power pins in the assembly. These pins are clad with D9 with a 0.230-inch outside diameter. will give a review of the experience with similar fuel pin designs.
This section
75'8) D9The
There have been a number of mixed oxide tests irradiated in FFTF cladding that have the same pin and duct dimensions as this test. test operating conditions that were assumed in the ISEs for these tests are summarized in Table 5 -1, and are briefly discussed below. The D9-1 through -4 tests were irradiated to demonstrate the long lifetime capability of the D9 cladding and ducts. The tests were run to cladding breach and, as can be seen from Table 5 -1, the tests reached quite high exposures. The CRBR-5 test was a C1 inch River Breeder Reactor (CRBR) prototype fuel assembly uti1 izing 09. 09 was the lead candidate for the cladding and duct material for the advanced core design for CRBR. The C-1 test was a D9 clad test designed to operate at two sigma hot channel conditions. All these tests completed irradiation without any indications of a safety problem. The tests that were run-to-cladding breach showed no indications of failure propagation, or any other unacceptable behavior.
5.2
The operating conditions for the UOz pins in UO-1 are compared to the previously irradiated pins of similar design in Table 5 the peak coolant temperature. The last column of 
S-4 MIXED OXIDE PIN EVALUATION
The S-4 pins will operate at a peak 1 inear power of approximately 10.74 kW/ft, which is considerably less than the 13.5 kW/ft peak linear power assumed for the UOz pins. Mixed oxide pins were shown to be acceptable at the 13.5 kW/ft peak linear power in Section 5.2. Similar pins have been run at higher powers for longer exposures, as discussed in Section 5.1. The S-4 pins are therefore acceptable for this test.
DRIVER FUEL PINS
The The computed lifetime is 422 EFPO. only 270 EFPD, the driver fuel pin lifetime is acceptable.
Since the exposure limit for this test is
The 3.1 driver fuel pins are vendor qualification pins and do not contain a gas tag, The lack o f a gas tag will result in slightly lower fuel temperatures at beginning-of-life, since the presence o f krypton or xenon lowers the thermal conductivity of the helium fill gas. The effect will be small, and is in the conservative direction. Each o f the vendor qualification pin fabrication and storage histories i s being examined to assure that there are no safety problems. Any nonconformances re1 at i ve to the driver fuel speci f i cat i on wi 11 be addresed in the review of the TDD-I1 for the test, and the technical justification reviewed and approved prior to final approval to irradiate the test.
WHC-SP-0549 The t e s t s were found t o be acceptable. Since, as discussed in Section 5, these t e s t s operated a t higher powers and higher cladding temperatures t h a n UO-1, and the designs of these t e s t s are similar t o UO-1, the transient analyses for these t e s t s envelopes the UO-1 t e s t . The fact that some of the UO-1 fuel i s enriched UOz will not change t h i s conclusion. The UO2 has a higher melting temperature and higher thermal conductivity t h a n the mixed oxide, so the margin t o fuel melting i s higher. The annular fuel will further increase the power-to-melt. Section 5.2 indicates t h a t the UO2 pins had a slightly higher fission gas pressure than mixed oxide pins a t the same exposure. The end-of-life exposures for the previously irradiated t e s t s discussed in Section 5 are much higher than the planned exposure for the UO-1 t e s t . The transient analyses for the previously irradiated t e s t s were performed a t much higher pin fission gas pressures t h a n will occur in any of the UO-1
pins. The peak transient coolant temperatures would be well below boiling, and the probability of a cladding breach i s low for t h i s t e s t . The t e s t i s therefore judged t o be acceptable with respect t o the design transients.
The effects of these 7.0 FAILURE CONSEQUENCES Various f a i l u r e modes have been evaluated for t h i s t e s t including the consequences of a cladding breach, misloading of the pins, and misloading of the t e s t . These failure modes are discussed in Section 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3, respectively.
CONSEQUENCES OF A CLADDING BREACH
The consequences of a cladding breach in the UO2 or S-4 pins would be the same as i f a breach occurred in a standard driver fuel assembly. A fission gas signal would be noted and the t e s t identified by the tag gas. A delayed neutron signal might occur (probably some time a f t e r the breach), and an unplanned shutdown might be required t o remove the t e s t from the reactor, b u t there would be no other safety impact. The impact of a cladding breach in the t e s t driver pins would be the same except, since these p i n s do not contain a gas tag i t might not be possible make a positive identification that the UO-1 t e s t was the assembly with the breached pin. Removal of several t e s t s might be required, and i t i s conceivable that more than one shutdown might be required t o locate the assembly that released the fission gas. T h i s mode of operation i s undesirable from a plant operations impact, b u t i s not unacceptable i n terms of safety. A cladding breach in t h i s t e s t i s unlikely because of the relatively mild co ditions and the low exposure, so t h i s risk has been judged t o be acceptable. 9
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MISLOADING OF THE PINS
There would be no safety impact of misloading the pins within the assembly. The highest power pins are located near the center of the assembly, which is very close to the hottest location. The U02 or S-4 pins would operate at slightly higher powers if misloaded near the side of the assembly closest to the core centerline, but as discussed in Sections 5 and 6, these pins are not operating close to any safety limits. The power gradient in Row 4 is not very steep, and the change in pin power due to misloading a pin would be a few percent at most. A misload of the pins would compromise obtaining data from the test, but would be benign in terms of safety.
MISLOADING OF THE UO-1 ASSEMBLY INTO THE INCORRECT CORE LOCATION
The test is designed to be irradiated in a Row 4 position and would operate at higher than design temperatures if accidentally placed in a more central position.
There are a number of safeguards performed that would identify and correct such a misload. These safeguards have been effective in preventing an ascent to power with an incorrectly loaded assembly.
However, the misloading of an assembly has a very low probability.
The worst-case misload would be to place the U -1 assembly in core center rates are approximately 15% higher in Row 1 as compared to Position 2405. Locating the test in Row 1 instead of Row 4 would therefore result in approximately a 15% increase in the pin power. A 15% increase in power would not lead to sodium boiling, and in fact, the peak coolant temperature rise for the C-1 assembly was over 15% higher than UO-1 (See Table 5 -1). The worstcase misload would not cause the test to operate at a power-to-flow that is unacceptable.
(Row 1). The fission rate data in WHC-SP-0333 s indicates that the fission
HCDA ANALYSIS
The UO-1 test would behave during the HCDA in a similar manner to a standard driver fuel assembly. The time at which pin failure occurred might be slightly different than would occur for a standard driver fuel assembly, but the UO-1 assembly would have no significant effect on the HCDA consequences.
STRUCTURAL AND SEISMIC ANALYSIS
The UO-1 structural and seismic performance would be identical to a standard driver fuel assembly, since there are no significant differences in terms of the structural or seismic design of the test.
CRITICALITY AND TEST HANDLING CONSIDERATIONS
The UO-1 test has been reviewed for criticality safety and has been placed on the list o f approved assemblies as an assembly no more reactive than a driver fuel assembly. The criticality limits used for handling the standard driver fuel assembl ies are appropriate.
There are no special handling considerations for this test. handling limits are appropriate, since there are no failure mechanisms, such
Reference driver
